Freedom House: Countries at the Crossroads 2006 - Bahrain report
Country Report - Bahrain http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=7&ccrpage=31&ccrcountry=111
Introduction
Bahrain is the least wealthy of the oil-producing Arab Gulf states, and boasts an exceptionally well-educated and politically sophisticated citizenry. A brief period of constitutional and parliamentary government was brought to an abrupt end by order of the ruler (amir) in August 1975. Persistent popular agitation to reinstate the electoral order exploded into widespread violence from 1994 to 1999. During the course of the uprising, tensions heightened between the dominant Sunni population and the subordinate Shia. Long-standing agreement among liberal reformers in the two communities began to erode, opening the door to more radical movements in both camps.
After proclaiming Bahrain a monarchy in February 2002, Sheikh Hamad bin 'Isa Al Khalifah has presided over a steady contraction of the package of political reforms that was introduced during 2000-01. Liberal and radical activists who applauded the restoration of the National Assembly (al-Majlis al-Watani) were greatly disappointed by the regime's decision to accord the appointed upper house, the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura), the same legislative powers as the popularly elected lower house, the Chamber of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwwab). Furthermore, the amended constitution of 2002 takes away the right of elected representatives to introduce bills for parliamentary debate and instead requires that all draft laws be referred to committee and introduced to the assembly by the Council of Ministers. In October 2002, King Hamad promulgated a revised Press and Publications Law, which imposes severe penalties for publishing any report that criticizes the monarchy, jeopardizes national unity, advocates changes to the country's political system, or denigrates Islam. That same month, the monarch issued Decree Number 56, which grants blanket immunity from criminal and civil prosecution to any official suspected of inflicting torture or otherwise violating human rights in the past.
Accountability and Public Voice – 2.52 According to the amended constitution, the 40 members of the Chamber of Representatives are to be selected by popular vote every four years. The first parliamentary election under the terms of the revised constitution took place in October 2002, in an atmosphere that proved to be largely free of outright fraud and intimidation. Nevertheless, the Council of Ministers enacted a new citizenship law three months before the balloting that permitted citizens of the other five member-states of the Gulf Co-operation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman) to obtain concurrent Bahraini nationality, with full voting rights, thereby diluting the influence of natural-born citizens. The cabinet also issued a political rights statute that blocked popular societies and civic organizations from "participating in any electoral campaign on behalf of any candidates" and prohibited "campaigning in religious places, universities and schools, public squares, roads and government buildings."1 After critics of the regime won a majority of the seats contested in municipal council elections in May 2002, electoral districts were reconfigured to improve the chances of pro-regime candidates and give greater weight to the country's Sunni population. More important, thousands of Syrians, Yemenis, and Baluchis who held positions in the armed forces, police, and intelligence services were granted the right to vote. Reformers immediately condemned this administrative move, which they labeled "political naturalization," that is, citizenship conferred for largely illegitimate "political" motives.
In response to such machinations, and to protest the general terms of the amended constitution, four major popular societies boycotted the parliamentary election. These were the Islamic National Accord Society (al-Wifaq), the National Democratic Action Society (al-Amal al-Watani al-Dimuqrati or al-Wa'ad), the National Bloc (al-Tajammu' al-Qawmi), and the Islamic Action Society (al-Amal al-Islami). Just over 53 percent of eligible voters participated in the first round of balloting for the Chamber of Representatives, while no more than 45 percent turned out for the second round. Twenty-eight Sunnis and 12 Shias ended up being elected to the Chamber of Representatives. A majority of the Sunni members belonged to the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin), most of whom hailed from the association's more moderate mainstream, while a small number came from the more radical (or salafi) wing.
Political parties are prohibited by law, although the Chamber of Representatives periodically raises the question of whether formal parties should be permitted to emerge. The king is on record as saying that the establishment of organized political parties is an issue for the legislature to decide. A proposal to allow the formation of political parties was rejected by the parliamentary legislative and legal affairs committee in May 2004.2 Two months later, the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry took an important step toward breaking the impasse by setting up a political action committee to lobby the National Assembly on matters of concern to local businesspeople.3
Nothing of consequence was discussed in the National Assembly during the first year after the elections. But as 2003 came to a close, it became apparent that the country's two primary social welfare and retirement agencies were rapidly approaching insolvency. A special commission selected from the Chamber of Representatives by the chamber's speaker drew up a report charging three cabinet ministers with "mismanaging the funds" held by these agencies and engaging in "a number of failed investments" that had drained their coffers.4 When the government showed little interest in the report, five members of the commission called for a public "parliamentary interrogation" of the three ministers. This step was strongly resisted by the Speaker, on the grounds that too much parliamentary activism might prompt the king to suspend the National Assembly, as his father had done 30 years earlier. Although two of the ministers eventually submitted to questioning by the commission, both retained their posts as a result of various legal technicalities.5
In the wake of this episode, reformist members of parliament have become increasingly outspoken in voicing demands for change. Representatives in August 2004 called for the resignation of the minister of electricity following a power failure that plunged the country into a 12-hour blackout.6 Seven months later, the Chamber of Representatives amended its rules to permit any future questioning of cabinet ministers to take place in full session rather than in closed committee. A group of 15 influential representatives, including the first deputy speaker, introduced a sweeping proposal in June 2005 to increase the size of the elected lower house from 40 to 45 members, to give the Chamber of Representatives the authority to question the prime minister, and to require that cabinet ministers receive parliamentary approval before taking office.7 These initiatives had not been overturned by the Council of Ministers by the end of the year.
Beyond the confines of the National Assembly, the range of public debate remains tightly constrained. In February 2004, the four organizations that had boycotted the 2002 parliamentary elections announced plans to hold a two-day conference to discuss what they called the constitutional crisis confronting the country. Government officials riposted that no such crisis existed and that the activities of the four associations demonstrated the overall health of Bahrain's political system. As the conference opened, one senior official remarked that the gathering was "illegal because the organizers failed to get the required license from the Ministry of Labor and Social affairs."8 Foreign participants were stopped at the airport and prevented from entering the country. The minister of the royal court, Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifah, remarked that "it is necessary that all public discussions on domestic matters stipulated by the constitution be confined to Bahrainis, and no one else should be involved."
In September 2004, the prestigious 'Urubah Club hosted a public forum on the problem of persistent poverty in Bahrain. During the course of the program, one of the featured speakers, the vice president of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), insisted that the government should be held accountable for its failure to alleviate poverty and unemployment and that the cabinet should accept its collective responsibility by resigning. These remarks sparked a firestorm of condemnation. The speaker, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Khawajah, was arrested on charges of insulting high-ranking officials and "inciting hatred of the regime, spreading rumors that may disturb the public stability and harming the public interest"; the 'Urubah Club was closed down for 45 days; and the king, after taking the unusual step of personally chairing a meeting of the Council of Ministers, issued a proclamation denouncing those who "incite sedition and create divisions in the community, especially in the political forums that abuse the political openness and freedom of expression."9 Shortly thereafter the BCHR was shut down by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, on the grounds that its actions had contravened the provisions of the 1989 Associations Law that prohibited civic associations from engaging in political affairs Al-Khawajah was sentenced to one year in prison, but in late November 2004 the king granted him clemency.
In October 2004, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs sent notices to 80 civic associations and nongovernmental organizations warning them to set up permanent headquarters and abide by the terms of the 1989 Associations Law or else face immediate closure.10 A month later, the cabinet introduced a draft law requiring any public meeting or popular demonstration to obtain prior approval from the provincial governor. It also prohibits motor vehicles from being used in rallies, unless permission is granted in advance by the minister of the interior.11 The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs shut down the opposition Islamic Action Society for 45 days in July 2005 after speakers at an event it had sponsored at the Bahrain Society of Engineers made remarks that were openly critical of the government and the ruling family. An even more stringent set of regulations governing the activities of licensed political societies was adopted in the wake of this event.
Nevertheless, popular societies and civic organizations continue to proliferate. By the spring of 2005, the number of officially recognized associations was approaching 400. Of these, 24 have been licensed as political societies and are thereby allowed to sponsor public workshops, conferences, and debates on policy-related issues with the permission of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.
A revised Associations Law was adopted in July 2005. It imposes tighter restrictions on the internal procedures and fund-raising operations of political societies and makes it illegal for such organizations to be based on class, profession, geographical domain, or confessional character.12 Penalties for violating the statute include lengthy jail sentences, even life imprisonment.13 Existing political societies were required to apply to the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs for re-licensing by early October. Some societies, particularly ones based in such predominantly Sunni districts as al-Muharraq but also the major Shia organization al-Wifaq, complied with the new requirement, while a number of others, including the prominent liberal association The Forum (al-Muntada), opted not to do so and reverted to being purely social and civic organizations.
Petitioning the authorities directly continues to be an important means by which Bahraini citizens express demands for change. In July 2003, al-Wifaq presented a petition to the royal court (diwan) signed by 33,000 individuals that called for the immediate repeal of Decree Number 56; the petition went unanswered. The society then shifted its efforts to obtaining as many signatures as possible on a petition that demanded basic revisions in the amended constitution. In response, the minister of the royal court issued a statement that called the petition campaign illegal, as "no other party [except the king and cabinet] has the right to call for changes in the constitution."14 In May 2004, police raided four signature-collection stations across the country and arrested 19 activists. When the authorities agreed not to prosecute the detainees, al-Wifaq temporarily suspended the petition drive.
A group of women organized as the Women's Petition Committee presented the diwan with a petition in December 2004 urging the adoption of a unified personal status code in place of the existing system of religion-based family laws.15 Two months later, after 75,000 citizens had attached their signatures to it, the petition for constitutional revision was presented to the diwan. It was once again refused, this time on the grounds that all political demands should be handed over to the National Assembly.
Restrictions mandated by the 2002 Press and Publications Law impose severe limitations on local journalists including severe penalties for publishing any report that criticizes the monarchy, jeopardizes national unity, advocates changes to the country's political system, or denigrates Islam. In August 2003, the Ministry of Information circulated a memorandum among foreign news agencies that instructed them not to dispatch reports regarding the government's policy of political naturalization. However, the editors of Bahrain's major newspapers have been granted weekly meetings with the heads of various government departments. The journalists take advantage of these sessions to ask tough, unscripted questions. If the audience is small enough, state officials are reported to offer surprisingly frank and direct answers. Ministers have even taken steps on occasion to change policy or revise official procedures in response to the questions and comments raised in these forums. On the whole, major newspapers enjoy a degree of latitude and freedom from official harassment that is not accorded to smaller publications. Local television and radio stations, by contrast, remain government owned and only broadcast reports that praise or congratulate the regime for its activities.
State agencies have routinely blocked local access to a variety of internet sites with the assistance of the country's primary service provider, the Bahrain Telephone Company (Batelco). The justification for doing so has usually been either that the proscribed sites incite sectarianism or that they impugn the good name of the nation. State officials routinely monitor postings and weblogs on sites run by local activists, including such community forums as Diraz.net and al-Muntadayyat. In February 2005, police went a step further and arrested the moderator of the Arabic-language web forum www.bahrainonline.org, 'Ali 'Abd al-Imam. The moderator and two of his technical assistants were charged with "defamation of the king, inciting hatred against the regime and spreading rumors and lies that could cause disorder."16 The three were released after a series of well-organized popular protests.
Recommendations
The king should announce a firm date by which members of the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura) will be chosen by popular election rather than by royal appointment.
The regulation that requires any group that wishes to organize a public debate or workshop to obtain a license from the authorities (whether from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs, or the provincial governor) should be abolished.
The palace should agree to accept formal petitions from societies and associations rather than only from individuals.
The 2002 Press and Publications Law should be rescinded or drastically revised to permit greater freedom of speech. Civil Liberties – 3.73 In early 2003, the government-sponsored BHRS released a report stating that all political prisoners had been released and that those individuals who had been dismissed from employment in state agencies (including the University of Bahrain) for their political activities during the 1990s had been reinstated.17 In addition, the report noted that the law that prohibited societies and organizations from campaigning on behalf of candidates for the National Assembly had been amended to permit such activity in the future.18 It pointed out as well that peaceful demonstrations and public gatherings no longer elicit brutal and indiscriminate responses from the police, as they had done as recently as the spring of 2002.
Representatives of popular societies and civic organizations confirm the main points of the BHRS's 2003 report. Leading figures of al-Wifaq concur that there is at present no institutionalized or systematic torture or imprisonment of political activists but only isolated incidents of mistreatment and harassment. The killing of protesters has always been a rare occurrence in Bahrain, even at the height of the popular uprising of 1994-99. The three dozen persons who died as a result of actions by the police during the course of the uprising are still honored openly as martyrs by their home communities, giving the authorities an added incentive to behave with restraint.
Long-term detention without trial is prohibited by the amended constitution and has been abandoned in practice in recent years. Following the repeal of the draconian State Security Law in 2001, anyone who is suspected of committing a crime is routinely charged or released within 48 hours of arrest. The courts are reported to have rejected occasional requests from the police to hold suspects for longer periods of time.19 The constitution also protects the country's citizens from all forms of mental and physical torture and prohibits information gathered by means of torture from being used in judicial proceedings. Oddly enough, the amended constitution fails to guarantee explicitly that Bahraini citizens will not be forced into exile, a measure that was an important instrument of government policy toward political dissidents in the 1990s. It does, however, protect citizens from any imposed limitations on their freedom of movement, which may imply a constitutional guarantee against forced exile. Exile is not being used as a punishment at the present time.
The situation confronting Bahraini women remains fundamentally ambiguous. On the one hand, Article 5 of the amended constitution guarantees full equality between men and women. In addition, Article 18 states that "people are equal in human dignity, and citizens are equal before the law in public rights and duties. There shall be no discrimination among them on the basis of sex, origin, language, religion or creed." The government is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). In 2003, the authorities embarked on a highly publicized campaign to end all trafficking in women and children in the country and created a special task force to deal with the problems faced by the large number of vulnerable female domestic servants.20 Major societies and civic organizations, including such overtly Islamist associations as al-Wifaq, openly advocate greater educational and career opportunities for women and actively recruit female members. A small number of outstanding women have risen to top positions in local business, including enterprises closely linked to the state.
On the other hand, Article 5 of the revised constitution also notes that the guarantee of equality between men and women is bounded by "the provisions of Islamic canon law (Shari'ah)." Similarly, Bahrain's adherence to CEDAW is predicated on the stipulation that the convention's implementation must conform to the tenets of Islamic law and that traditional restrictions on the movement of female family members must be recognized.21 Women are routinely treated differently from men in the proceedings of both the civil and religious courts. By early 2004, a law had been enacted that prohibited all female students from entering or leaving the campus of the University of Bahrain with any man who was not her father, brother, or husband.22 Furthermore, women occupy significantly fewer senior posts in private and public companies and government agencies than might be expected given the fact that females currently account for almost one-quarter of the total labor force.
Discrimination against women takes a variety of forms, from a passive adherence to long-standing misogynistic practices and attitudes to an outright refusal to hire and promote